THE FORESEEN, THE FORESEEABLE, AND
BEYOND-ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY TO
NONCLIENTS
R. James Gormley*
It is characteristic of our federal system that if a party were to
litigate a controversy involving a single common-law issue in every
one of the fifty-four common-law jurisdictions of the United States, he
would neither win nor lose all of his cases, because of diverse findings
of fact and interpretations of law among the courts. This certainly
would be the case if the litigant were a professional accountant defending himself against liability for damages sustained by a nonclient
resulting from alleged negligence in the accountant's professional
work.' The accountant could, however, fare better in most courts
than he would if he had to try his case in the law reviews, 2 given the
great preponderance of sentiment favoring expansion of liability in
this area.
This article explores the evolution of the law governing the liability of accountants to third parties and predicts how recent developments both in the literature and in some recent court decisions may
affect the accounting profession. Specific attention will be given to the
judicial interpretations and misinterpretations in United States opinions of the supposedly discrete terms-"primary benefit" ("end and
aim"), "specifically (or 'actually') foreseen," and "reasonably foreseeable"-that are intended to subdivide an infinite range of varying
factual situations. The article also considers the terms used and analyses made in cases with similar facts in the common-law jurisdictions of

* Member of the Illinois bar; partner in the Chicago law firm of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd;
certified public accountant; author of THE LAW OF ACCOUNTANTS AND AuDITORS (1981).
The author acknowledges the assistance of his associate, Donald J. Bingle, in the preparation of this article. Copyright 1983 by R. James Gormley.
A casual reader of this article might obtain the misimpression from the "adverse selection"
of the relatively small number of accountants' controversies in proportion to the total engagements of the profession that accountants rarely do anything correctly; a similar misimpression
would be received from similar papers concerning lawyers, doctors, and other professionals.
See, e.g., Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to
Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 507 (1976); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the
Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation,20 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 233 (1983);
Note, PublicAccountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
588 (1972).
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the British Commonwealth. It confirms, by recognizing the inconsistencies of judicial interpretation and application, that the beauty of
such terms of art, as in art generally, is in the eye of the beholdereach individual beholder. Finally, it suggests that the decisive influences in all of our seemingly objective deliberations on abstract issues
social, political, economic and
of legal semantics may be our differing
3
ethical instincts and convictions.
I.

THE FoREsEEN

A. Restatement (Second) of Torts
Out of the diversity of the United States common-law jurisdictions has emerged the Restatements of the Law, a product of legal
practitioners working under the auspices of the prestigious American
Law Institute, a nongovernmental institution. The objective of the
Restatements is to identify and clarify the rules of common law that,
based upon collective study and deliberation, are believed to reflect
the views prevailing in judicial opinions of United States courts. The
intent is to set forth the preponderant rules as they are, not as some of
the deliberate participants think they should be. Ideally, a Restatement section is a synthesis of the majority judicial view on a commonlaw principle, cited to and often respected by courts, not as a binding
precedent of a jurisdiction, but as the persuasive authority of other
courts.
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement or
section 552), 4 was published in 1977 following a study commenced in
the early 1960's. It limits the liability of a professional who has made
a negligent misrepresentation (eg., in an audit opinion) to loss suffered:
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends
the recipient so intends
the information to influence or knows that
6
or in a substantially similar transaction.
This formulation confines an accountant's liability to the persons or
limited classes of persons whose reliance upon the negligent misrepre3 See supra note 2.

§ 552 (1977).
See id. (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); id. (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965); id. (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
6 Id. § 552(2)(a), (b).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
5
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sentation is (or, as in all cases, should be) foreseen or specifically
foreseen by the accountant, and does not extend liability to those
whose reliance is foreseeable or reasonablyforeseeable to the account7
ant, but is not specifically foreseen by him.
Regardless of the clarity of the Restatement formulation, interpretation of the section is sometimes obscured by misunderstandings
of the difference between the terms foreseen and foreseeable. Some
opinions, though accepting and applying the foreseen rule in accountants' liability cases, have misinterpreted it insofar as they employ the
word foreseeable or some derivative of that term. 8 Conversely, one
opinion refers to auditors' "further duty to those persons whom they
can reasonably foresee will need to use and rely upon" the audited
financial statements, 9 and to the formidable difficulties of attempting
"to prove that an auditor should have foreseen the plaintiff's likely
reliance upon some newspaper or a stock exchange reference to" the
financial statements.' 0 The potential for confusion is illustrated by the
fact that, in the context of that opinion, the references actually relate
to the justice's advocacy of "the comprehensible and straightforward
test of foreseeability."I
On the other hand, a somewhat comparable reference to "an
unlimited class of equity holders who could not be reasonablyforeseen
as a third party who would be expected to rely on a financial statement" 2 means specifically foreseen in the context of that opinion. A
number of writers avoid this confusion by consistently adding descriptive adverbs that help in distinguishing the terms, as in specifically or
13
actually foreseen and reasonably foreseeable.

See id. comments h, i, j, illustrations 5-7. 10.
See Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 382-84 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973) (mentioning "foreseeability of harm," but applying "foreseen" concept of § 552); Haddon
View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 157-58, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214-15
(1982) (discussing the "innocent third party who foreseeably relies," but applying "specifically
foreseen" formulation of § 552); see also Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 129-30, 248 N.W.2d
291, 302 (1976); 999 v. Cox & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (Missouri law);
Haig v. Bamford, 72 D.L.R.3d 68, 77 (Can. 1976). One writer, in comparing the merits of "the
reasonably foreseeable test, and the actually foreseen test," endorsed "[t]he reasonably foreseeable test, which is best reflected in the Restatement[!]." Mess, Accountants and the Common
Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NoniE DAME LAW. 838, 857 (1977).
' Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553, 575 (N.Z. Ct. App. 1977)
(emphasis added) (defendant-auditor).
10 Id. (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
12 Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added) (defendantaccountant).
13 See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 93 (D.R.I. 1968) ("actually foreseen";
defendant-accountant).
7
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B. Significance of the Restatement to Accountants
For a third of a century, from 1931 to the late 1960's, the law
governing accountants' liability to nonclients was dominated by the
towering opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in the New York case of
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche. 14 In declining to hold a negligent accountant liable to an unidentified nonclient, Judge Cardozo distinguished accountants from others because the extent of their potential
liability would be excessive in comparison with the extent of their
fault:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes to these consequences."
Judge Cardozo also distinguished his earlier opinion in the "bean
weighers' " case of Glanzer v. Shepard16 in which defendant-public
weighers, who were engaged by a seller of beans to certify the weight
to the buyer, were held liable for negligently producing an overweight
certificate on which the buyer relied in paying the seller. In that case
Judge Cardozo had reasoned: "The plaintiffs' use of the certificates
was not an indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the
weighers. It was a consequence which, to the weighers' knowledge,
was the end and aim of the transaction. 1 7 The service provided by the
accountant in Ultramares, however, "was primarilyfor the benefit of
the [client] . . . and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of
those to whom [the client] and his associates might exhibit it thereafter."' 8
The criticism of Ultramareshad its genesis in subsequent overlyrigorous interpretations of the "primarily for the benefit" language.
One might have expected the New York courts to apply the "end and

4 255 N.Y. 170, 184, 187, 174 N.E. 441, 446, 447 (1931) (citing Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas.
337 (1889) (no third-person liability for negligent misstatement in prospectus); Landell v.
Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919) (accountant-defendant had no duty of care to "stranger")).
'5 Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444 (emphasis added).
16 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
17 Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275 (emphasis added).
11 Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446 ("In a word, the service rendered by the
defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if
not in name, a party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee.").
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aim" test of the bean weighers' case to impose liability on a negligent
accountant who knew that the product of his services would be relied
20
9
on by a nonclient known to him.' In State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,
however, the New York Court of Appeals arrived at a different result.
In that case, the accountant knew that the plaintiff intended to rely
on the client's audited financial statements in deciding whether to
make a loan to the client. The court, with no mention of the bean
weighers' case, interpreted the primary benefit language of Ultramares as absolving the accountant of negligence "in the absence of a
contractual relationship or its equivalent. ' 21 As a consequence, Ultramares came to symbolize a requirement of privity of contract which in
hindsight appears to be a more rigorous requirement than Judge
Cardozo may have intended in either Ultramaresor Glanzer.
The privity of contract limitation ascribed to Ultramares pervaded accountants' liability decisions for decades, both in the United
States and in the British Commonwealth. 22 In the 1951 United Kingdom case of Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co.,23 the defendantauditor's employees negligently "prepared" a client's "accounts" (financial statements). The defendant knew that the financial
statements were to be used to induce the plaintiff to make an investment in the client and, at the client's request, the defendant actually
presented them to the plaintiff and discussed them with the plaintiff
and his client. 24 Nevertheless, a majority of the justices held that the
defendant had no duty of care to the plaintiff for the resulting loss of
his investment. Although the majority primarily considered the court
to be bound (under a rule of the court) by controlling English precedent,2 5 one of the two justices devoted considerable attention in his
opinion to quotations from Ultramares,26 and expressed satisfaction
" See Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 342 n.1 (D. Neb. 1979) (construing
Nebraska and Indiana law), and Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291, 295 n.3
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), in both of which the defendants were accountants.
20 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938) (defendant-auditor). For additional defendantauditor cases under New York law, see C.I.T. Fin. Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955);
O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937); Duro Sportswear,
Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), afj'd mem., 285 A.D. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829
(App. Div. 1955).
21 State St. Trust, 278 N.Y. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 418.
22 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937);
Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 285 A.D. 867,
137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (App. Div. 1955); Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., [1951] 1 All E.R. 426
(C.A.).
23 [1951] 1 All E.R. 426 (C.A.).
24 Id. at 428-29.
25 Id. at 437 (citing Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491).
26 Id. at 447-49.
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that his conclusion "on the basis of the English authorities seems to
accord with the opinion of so eminent a student of the common law as
CARDOZO, C.J. 2 7

In a strong dissent, the distinguished and influential Lord Denning argued with prescience that an accountant's duty to avoid negligence should extend not only to his employer and client but also:
to any third person to whom [the accountants] themselves show the
accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show
the accounts so as to induce him to invest money or take some other
action of them ....

[H]owever, the duty [should not] be extended

still further so as to include strangers of whom they have heard
without their knowledge may
nothing and to whom their employer
28
choose to show their accounts.
Such a duty to nonclients, the dissent reasoned, should be confined:
to cases where the accountant prepares his accounts and makes his
report for the guidance of the very person in the very transaction in
question.... 29 Whether he would be liable if he prepared his
accounts for the guidance of a specific class of persons in a specific
class of transactions, I do not say. I should have thought he might
be.... 30
In 1963, Lord Denning's dissent was cited approvingly, and the
majority opinions were expressly disapproved, by the House of Lords
in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd.3 1 In Hedley Byrne,
defendant-bank had negligently worded an accommodation credit
report concerning one of its customers to a second bank. Plaintiff, a
customer of the second bank, relied on the report to its detriment in
advancing credit to the defendant's customer. 32 The justices appeared
to agree in theory that the defendant could be held liable3 3 upon a
finding of a "special duty" owed by the defendant to the plaintifflender arising from the existence of a "special relationship" between

Id. at 450.
Id. at 434.
29 Id. at 435 (quoting Cardozo's "indeterminate" language in Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 17980, 174 N.E. at 444).
30 Id.
M1 [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L. 1963).
32 Id. at 467-69.
3 Nevertheless, because the defendants had specifically disclaimed responsibility for the
reliability of their report, the court found no duty of care arose, thus exculpating the defendants.
E.g., id. at 492-93, 540.
27
28
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the parties. 34 The justices' use of the terms "special relationship" and
"special duty" has led some United States lawyers to conclude that the
Hedley Byrne decision was somewhat less than clear in providing a
legal standard for courts to follow. The Restatement reporter described the opinion as "quite vague, and not in agreement," and
35
stated that "[t]he case obviously throws little light" on the issue.
As will be discussed later in this article,36 it has become clear
that, in the context of both earlier and later opinions, "special relationship" and "special duty" are terms of art in United KingdomCommonwealth law, with associations of meaning that are not readily apparent to nonreaders of those opinions. The Restatement
reporter, however, did summarize Hedley Byrne in the discussion of
the 1965 Tentative Draft of section 552, because, in the absence of a
controlling precedent of the jurisdiction, state supreme courts may
"look to the entire body of Anglo-American law" in determining an
issue. 37 Indeed, the Hedley Byrne decision and other United Kingdom-Commonwealth decisions have been relied on by the United
38
States courts in cases of first impression.
The concept of a specifically foreseen person and limited class of
persons in the present section 552 dilutes the Ultramaresrationale and
appears (superficially, it turns out) to be in harmony with the opinions
in the English case of Hedley Byrne and especially with the prophetic
dissent in Candler, as well as with other judicial opinions in cases
against accountants. 39 Section 552, consistent with the general purpose of the Restatement, attempts to synthesize these prevailing opinions into one coherent standard. Regardless of the potential for some
courts to confuse its terms, 40 at this time the section represents the best
effort to provide guidelines41 for determining the liability of accountants and putting them on notice as to whom they will be liable for
their negligent conduct.

34

See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text for discussion of the court's use of these

terms.
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
31 See Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 341 (D. Neb. 1979) (construing Nebraska and Indiana law), and Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.R.I. 1968)
(construing Rhode Island and New York law), in both of which the defendants were accountants.
38 See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D.R.I. 1968).
31 See, e.g., id.; Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401-02 (Iowa 1969).
40 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
4 The comments to § 552 provide specific illustrations of the potential liability of an auditor
possessing various degrees of knowledge of the client's stated purpose of the audit. RESTATEMENT
3

36

RESTATEMENT
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C. Some Continuing Adherence to Privity of Contract
During the two decades since the tentative revision of section
552 was first circulated, some courts have refused to find accountants
liable to nonclients for negligence in the absence of privity of contract. 42 In all of these cases, Ultramares has been relied on as a
primary authority, even though in most of those cases, the defendantaccountants would, or at least might, have been liable under a specifically foreseen person or limited class theory. Some of the plaintiffs in

OF TORTS § 552, comment h, illustrations 5, 6, 7 & 10, at 134-35 (1977): (5) for
submission to X bank (only) in obtaining a loan, upon failure of X bank, submitted to Y bank for
a loan, without notice to the auditor; auditor not liable to Y bank; (6) for submission in obtaining
a loan from some bank, naming X bank as a possibility; auditor liable to Y bank; (7) for
submission in obtaining a loan from some bank; auditor liable to Y bank: . . . (10) annual audit,
with no stated intention concerning use, though auditor knows of customary use of past'financial
statements and audit opinions in numerous business, financial, and investment transactions [as in
Ultramares]; submitted in obtaining a loan from X bank; auditor not liable to X bank. See id.
In addition, the reliance requirement of § 552 is interpreted in the comments to the section
as follows:
Thus independent public accountants who negligently make an audit of books of a
corporation, which they are told is to be used only for the purpose of obtaining a
particular line of banking credit, are not subject to liability to a wholesale merchant
whom the corporation induces to supply it with goods on credit by showing him the
financial statements and the accountant's opinion. On the other hand, it is not
necessary that the transaction in which the opinion is relied on shall be identical in
all of its minute details with the one intended. It is enough that it is substantially the
same transaction or one substantially similar.
Id., comment j, at 137.
42 In chronological sequence: Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (plaintiff-investor is client known to auditor; court discussed § 552 and
Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 236, 135 N.E. at 275 (miscategorized as third-party beneficiary case), but
considered itself bound by State St. Trust, 278 N.Y. at 104, 15 N.E.2d at 416, and Florida
precedent); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(plaintiff-lender to client appealed jury verdict for accountant submitted on negligence theory;
court followed Investment Corp. of Fla., 208 So. 2d at 291); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins &
Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff-purchasers of majority stock of client,
known to auditor; in construing Colorado law in diversity case, "the rule and reasoning of
Ultramares has predominated," and, citing recent foreseen person and class cases, requiring
"substantial evidence showing that Colorado would align itself with the developing trend";
additionally, auditors exercised due care); MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 370-71, 199
S.E.2d 564, 566 (Ct. App. 1973) (plaintiff-investors in client known to accountant; unaudited
financial statements; "Ultramares stands as the majority rule and we see no reason to depart
from its rationale"); Koch Indus., Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 725 (10th Cir. 1974) (plaintiffpurchaser of client not foreseen person because audit had been performed for earlier proposed
purchaser; Kansas law was determined to follow Ultramares,255 N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at 441;
"It also appears from the record that the law in the Bahamas is basically the same," citing Hedley
Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465), aff'g, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
93,705, at 93,133 (D. Kan. 1972) (Kansas law determined to require privity of contract; "the law
of England would follow that in Ultramarac [sic]," with no citation of United Kingdom
(SECOND)
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those cases might also have prevailed under a liberal interpretation of
the Glanzer "end and aim" test. Indeed, in cases of allegedly negligent
practices of persons in other professions and callings whose services
ordinarily affect only one or very few nonclients or noncustomers,
courts have tended to be more receptive to the economic grievances of
the latter. Some examples include a lawyer vis-a-vis intended but
disqualified beneficiaries of a will, 43 a land surveyor, 44 title abstractor, 45 or building inspector vis-a-vis a successor owner of property,4"
an architect vis-a-vis a building contractor, 47 and an insurance agent
confirming coverage vis-a-vis his insurance client. 48 Those opinions
suggest an analogy, though strained in varying degrees, to the end and
aim rule of Glanzer.
The opinions of the courts in New York, the state of origin of
Ultramares and Glanzer, require closer attention because they frequently are cited in opinions of other jurisdictions, particularly in
cases of first impression. In White v. Guarente,49 the defendantaccountant had been engaged by a limited partnership with approximately forty limited partners to perform auditing and tax return
services pursuant to the partnership agreement. Plaintiff, one of the
limited partners, alleged negligence by the accountant in knowing of
and failing to disclose large withdrawals of funds by the general
partners in violation of the partnership agreement. The court purported to distinguish Ultramares:

Authority); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff-purchaser of client known to auditor; federal court bound by Florida decisions, citing
Investment Corp. of Fla., 208 So. 2d at 291); William Iselin & Co. v. Muhlstock, Elowitz & Co.,
52 A.D.2d 540, 382 N.Y.S.2d 83 (App. Div. 1976); Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (annual
audit; plaintiff not a foreseen person; Investment Corp. of Fla., 208 So. 2d at 291 and
Canaveral, 214 So. 2d at 505, followed; additionally, defendant-auditor found not negligent);
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1202 (3d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff known purchaser of client;
Delaware law); see also Donovan Constr. Co. v. Woosley, 358 F. Supp. 375, 382-83 (W.D. Ark.
1973) (judgment for defendant-accountant; no negligence; no reliance by plaintiff; Arkansas
law).
" Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983); Ross v.
Caunters, [1979] 3 All E.R. 580 (Ch.); see Annot., 45 A.L.R. 3d 1181 (1972).
44 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
11 See cases cited in Annot., 34 A.L.R. 3d 1122 (1970).
11 Dutton v. Bognor Regis United Bldg. Co., [1972] 1 All E.R. 462 (Q.B.).
4' A.R. Mover, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
41 Lesser v. William Holliday Cord Assocs., Inc., 349 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1965) (Missouri
law).
40 43 N.Y.2d 356, 359, 372 N.E.2d 315, 317, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (1977). For a case
involving similar facts, see Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154,
436 N.E.2d 212 (1982) (foreseen class of four limited partners against accountant).
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Here, the services of the accountant were not extended to a faceless
or unresolved class of persons, but rather to a known group ...
[of] actual limited partners, fixed and determined ....

[T]he ac-

countant must have been aware that a limited partner would necessarily rely on or make use of the audit and tax returns of the
partnership, or at least constituents of them, in order to properly
prepare his or her own tax returns.50
The court then invoked the bean weighers' case: "Here, too, the
furnishing of the audit and tax return information, necessarily by
virtue of the relation, was one of the ends and aims of the transaction."'" But, with apparent significance, it concluded its reasoning in
the classic rubric of the foreseen limited class rule of section 552,
though not citing it expressly, by referring to a discussion in the
opinion of another court concerning inroads on Ultramares:
"The courts in diminishing the impact of Ultramareshave not only
embraced the rule of Glanzer-liability to a foreseen plaintiff-but
have extended an accountant's liability for negligence to those who,
although not themselves foreseen, are members of a limited class
whose reliance on the financial statements is specifically foreseen."
Here, plaintiff was a member of a limited class whose reliance on
the audit and returns was, or at least should have been, specifically
foreseen .52

It is understandable that the Ohio Supreme Court, in ruling for
plaintiffs in a similar suit against accountants, should observe that:
"Significantly, the strict interpretation of Ultramares has now been
rejected by the court which formulated the rule. . . We find the
interpretation of Ultramaresset forth in White v. Guarente to accord
with reason and justice. Moreover, the Restatement of Torts 2d and
various commentators have come to the same conclusion." 5 3 Also, in a

-0 White. 43 N.Y.2d at 361, 372 N.E.2d at 318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78 (citations
omitted).
51Id. at 362, 372 N.E.2d at 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (emphasis added).
52 Id. (quoting Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (emphasis added)).
51 Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 156, 436 N.E.2d 212,
214 (1982) (citations & footnote omitted) (defendant-auditor); see Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903-04, 451 A.2d 1308, 1311 (1982) (defendant-auditor); H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 421-22, 444 A.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 92 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) (defendant-auditor); infra notes 117-50
for a discussion of the Rosenblum decision.
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nonaccountant case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
after analyzing White, Ultramares,and Glanzer, applied section 552,
predicting that the New York courts would so apply it in a noncontract case, and finding that "the critical factor in the relationship
between the parties is their reasonable expectations, not their formal
legal relationship. '54 Some courts, however, have read White differently, regardless of the interpretation of the opinion by the Ohio
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit. In Dworman v. Lee, 55 a 1981
New York intermediate appeals court decision, the court concluded
that "there can be no doubt that the rule in Ultramares remains
authoritative, as it was in fact reaffirmed in White v. Guarente."
56
Subsequent New York opinions have come to the same conclusion.
The decisions reviewed or footnoted above adhered to the traditional rule of denying damages to nonclients because of lack of privity
of contract with the accountants. Of all these cases only in White,
which at least arguably applied this rule, did the ruling go against the
accountants.5 7 Nevertheless, even these early cases hinted at the limitation Ultramares would undergo in the specifically foreseen person
and class cases. As a result of changing times, conditions, and sentiments, 6Ultramares
has been diminished,5 8 "weakened"5 9 and
"eroded 0 by reinterpretation to such an extent that contemporary
Ultramares would scarcely be recognizable to Judge Cardozo or the
judges of State Street Trust.

m Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (New York common-law
negligence claim pendent to federal securities law action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
5 83 A.D.2d 507, 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd mem., 56 N.Y.2d 816,
438 N.E.2d 103, 452 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
56 See Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F. Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (defendant-auditor not
liable for negligence to client's creditor/subcontractor); International Paper Co. v. Fox & Co.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), N.Y.L.J., Jan. 20, 1984, at 6, col. 4; Herman v. Bruns, Nordeman, Rea &
Co., No. 91278/82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 1983); European Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs &
Kaye, No. 19904/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1983).
-1 In any case, the court did regard the plaintiffs, who were limited investment partners of
the tax shelter, as nonclients of the defendant-accountant. The opinion did not refer to the
traditional partnership law concept that a partnership is not a separate entity, hut is personified
by each partner; plaintiffs could have been brought into privity by a strained application of that
entity concept. In a suit by general (noninvestment) "working" partners of a partnership against
the partnership's accountants, a court might find privity of contract between the accountant and
the partners.
58 Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 342 (D. Neb. 1979)
(defendant-auditors).
5o Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 342 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v. Graff, 311
Minn. 110, 127, 248 N.W.2d 291, 301 (1976) (defendant-auditors).
60 Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Neb. 1979).
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One wonders about the extent and full implications of the revitalization of Glanzer evidenced in a number of opinions, particularly in
White, which referred to the case in finding the reliance of forty or so
limited partners to be one of the ends and aims of the accountant's
engagement-no longer the end and aim, and no longer the lone
buyer of beans. Forty is not a small number, and the reliance of
limited partners on financial information is comparable to reliance by
shareholders on corporate financial information, except in one regard:
The use of a partnership rather than a corporate vehicle in White and
in the similar Ohio case 6 ' was oriented to income tax strategy. A
corporate shareholder's investment income, which is reportable for
federal income tax purposes, is usually the dividends actually received. A partner, on the other hand, computes his federal income
taxes on the basis of his contractual share of the income or the loss,
and certain specially treated tax deductions and tax credits, as reported in the partnership income tax return. This is the case irrespective of whether the partner receives any distributions from the partnership. Consequently, erroneous partnership data are much more
directly sensitive to an aggrieved partner than are erroneous corporate
data to an aggrieved shareholder.
White would appear to admit any number of limited partners
into the charmed circle of the end and aim-be they four as in the
Ohio case, forty as in White, 400 or 4,000. Shareholders-be they
four, forty, 400 or 4,000-in corporations that are comparable in
nature and different only in tax strategy would be excluded, not only
from the end and aim category in privity of contract jurisdictions, but
also from the specifically foreseen class of the Restatement. Shareholders thus would be banished into the outer darkness of the merely
foreseeable and left to their remedies, if any, in fraud. For the 400 or
4,000 limited partners, the end and aim would have been transformed
from an illusory goal into a weapon of aggression-a serendipitous
bonus to the tax shelter investor-and for accountants, from a shield
into a scourge.
White is not easily reconcilable with the orthodox Ultramares
opinions, as is attested to by the divergent interpretations of the
opinions by other courts discussed above. 12 Despite Dworman, Ultramares has been interpreted by a New York trial court as "modified"

61

Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212

(1982); see discussion supra text accompanying note 53.
" See Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin, 561 F. Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Ultramares,
255 N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at 441, as law of New York and referring to White, 43 N.Y.2d at 356,
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(as opposed to being followed) by White as to limited partners.6 3 This
is essentially an arbitrary distinction. The White opinion cannot quite
withstand analysis, and thus will continue to cause difficulty.
D. Specifically Foreseen Person and Limited Class
Some of the specifically foreseen person and limited class opinions attempt, albeit unpersuasively, to equate or at least to reconcile
the concept of section 552 with the rationale of the Ultramares and
bean weighers' cases, and, although appearing to succeed, have further distorted those cases. Moreover, the opinions reveal that courts
tend to be more comfortable with identifying one or a few specific
persons than with identifying a specific limited class. Opinions involving contention between the foreseen and privity of contract rules are
discussed here, and those between the foreseen and the reasonably
foreseeable rules are discussed below under "The Foreseeable."
Opinions are cited in the specifically foreseen category if they
endorse any of several types of authority-section 552 or opinions that
embrace the specifically foreseen person or class-either United States
opinions or Hedley Byrne or other United Kingdom-Commonwealth
opinions. The United Kingdom-Commonwealth opinions, although
discussed briefly here, are left primarily for separate attention, because of differences in tradition, idiom, process of thought, and-as
will be seen-trend. Although cases dealing with nonaudit services
raise contentious questions of professional standards and performance,
they are not classified separately here because essentially they are
similar to audit cases as to the issue of whether a plaintiff's reliance
was "foreseen" or "foreseeable."
1. Specifically Foreseen Person
The first reported United States accountant case opinion subsequent to Hedley Byrne, and one that drew support from that case and
the Candler dissent, was the 1968 case of Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin.6 4 In Rusch, a New York plaintiff brought suit in the Federal
District Court for the District of Rhode Island seeking damages alleg-

372 N.E.2d at 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 474, as "an apparent exception to the rule"); see also cases
cited supra notes 53-54.
63 Herman v. Bruns, Nordeman, Rea & Co., No. 91278/82, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.
17, 1983).
' 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-92 (D.R.I. 1968) (citing Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465, and
Candler, [1951] 1 All E.R. at 426).
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edly resulting from the Rhode Island defendant-auditor's negligent
misrepresentation of the financial condition of the corporation to
which the plaintiff, in reliance on the defendant's representations,
extended credit. 15 By a curious conflict of laws analysis, the court
found it unnecessary to decide whether the alleged tort had occurred
in Rhode Island, the location of the defendant-auditor and his borrower-client and, in the perception of the court (though without any
close precedent), a section 552 state, or in New York, the location of
the single specifically foreseen lender, with its Ultramaresand bean
weighers' tradition. Rather, the court resorted to the generality that
the laws of both states are "grounded on the same theory of risk
distribution"66 and, without considering how each state might have
evaluated this theory with respect to the specific facts of the case,
reasoned that no conflict of laws existed. The court concluded that
under the circumstances it would "look to the entire Anglo-American
body of law.

6' 7

After a conventional citation of law review articles expressing
doubt as to the wisdom of Ultramares, the court found the case at
6 8 and its "undehand "qualitatively distinguishable from Ultramares"
fined, unlimited class of remote lenders . . . not actually foreseen but

only foreseeable,- 69 and "far more akin to the case of Glanzer v.
Shepard.' 70 The court did stop short of asserting that the single actually foreseen plaintiff-lender was equivalent to the buyer of beans,
although later it stated (in separate passages) that the financial statements in both Candler and in Rusch had the "very aim and purpose
[sic]" of reliance by a known plaintiff. 7' Then, despite the New York
precedent of State Street Trust, which had applied Ultramaresagainst
a known reliant third-person plaintiff, the court made the amazing
statement that "[i]n fact, the Glanzer principle has been applied to
accountants. ' 72 In the related discussion the court cited section 552,
the Candler dissent, and the Hedley Byrne decision, none of which
offer direct support for this proposition. The court concluded that an
accountant could be liable for the negligent misrepresentations he

65

Id. at 86-87.

11 Id. at 89; see also id. at 89-90 n.5 (employing phrase "basically the same").
61 Id. at 89.
68

Id.

69 Id.

10 Id. (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 92, 93.
72

Id. at 91.
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makes to "actually foreseen and limited classes of persons. '73 Consequently, it ruled against the accountant on his motion for dismissal.
Thus, the Federal District Court of Rhode Island, obviously
determined to apply the specifically foreseen person concept of section
552, and without citing any supporting substantive Rhode Island
precedent, established a vogue followed by other courts. The opinion
avoided the influence of the New York opinions, despite the admission
that according to more modern conflict of laws analysis, the law of
New York appeared to be more appropriate than that of Rhode Island.7 4 In sum, the opinion has contributed to an interpretation of
Ultramaresand Glanzer that is quite different from the way in which
those rulings were conceived by Judge Cardozo.
The Rusch opinion soon was followed in favor of a similar type of
plaintiff in the Iowa case of Ryan v. Kanne,75 in which the court
relied primarily upon Rusch, the bean weighers' case, and cases
against abstractors and against lawyers sued by will-beneficiaries. 76
Because the plaintiff was the acquirer of these defendant-accountant's
client, 'the court had no occasion to reflect on the fact that, unlike
professional accountants in general, the potential liability exposure of
the defendants in all of the cited opinions was limited to one or a very
few persons other than their respective clients or customers. Additionally, the court cited section 552 as "also" supporting the conclusions of
those opinions. 77 The court cited no controlling Iowa precedent.
The above cases were followed by a series of opinions in similar
United States cases against accountants, with all but one ruling in
favor of the single specifically foreseen person lending to or acquiring
the accountant's client. In all of these cases the court distinguished or
refused to follow Ultramares, and relied primarily on Glanzer as
78
refashioned by Rusch, section 552, or both.

7'Id. at 93.
7'Id. at 89 n.5. Moreover, the court acknowledged the absence of any Rhode Island statute
or judicial precedent on the choice of law problem. Id. at n.4.
75 170 N.W.2d 395, 401-02 (Iowa 1969) (actually a cross-claim plaintiff, acquirer of client's
business, in plaintiff-accountant's ill-fated suit for professional fee for nonaudit accounting
services; negligence in investigation of accounts payable).
76 Id. at 401-02.
77 Id.
18 In chronological sequence: Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971) (acquirer of client; advocating § 552 as law of Texas; also following Glanzer, 233
N.Y. at 236, 135 N.E. at 275, Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85, and architect, will beneficiary-lawyer,
and property damage cases); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner
& Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972) (lender; failure to detect nonexistence of capitalized
improvements; following Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85, interpretation of Rhode Island law and
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Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek79 resists neat classification, either
among the foreseen, the foreseeable, and the general public, or between a person and a class. The case is interesting as an illustration of
bewilderment, and as a reproach to the efforts of legal writers to
classify everything. In Seedkem, which involved a suit by a trade
creditor against the allegedly negligent accountant of the debtor, the
plaintiff put its worst foot forward by contending "that defendant was
aware that the [unaudited] financial statements prepared by him
were for distribution to the general public, particularly the plaintiff . . . , and that the financial statements would be relied upon by
businesses such as plaintiff."80 According to such a contention, plaintiff may have been no more than a member of the unlimited class of
the public, or at best a member of an allegedly protected class of
"businesses" not otherwise specified, perhaps foreseeable though not
actually foreseen. On the other hand, the opinion alluded to the

§ 552, and citing Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465, and dissent in Candler, [1951] 1 All E.R. at
428); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 384 n.7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)
(acquirer of client; cumulatively material effect of alleged negligence regarding 13 items;
following Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 236, 135 N.E. at 275, Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85, and § 552, and
citing Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465, and dissent in Candler, [1951] 1 All E.R. at 428);
Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (D.N.D. 1974) (lender; inventory valuation;
diversity case construing North Dakota law; following § 552 as a "better rule" than Ultramares,
255 N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at 441, but ruling for defendant under either theory because of (1) no
reliance by plaintiff, and (2) no negligence by auditor-the latter at least disputable on facts
stated in opinion); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 308-10 & 310 n.59 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) ("obvious and mechanical" errors; reliance on unaudited financial statements by
client's five shareholders in negotiating with acquirer of client; pendent common-law claim in
securities law action, construing Pennsylvania and New Jersey law; following Glanzer, 233 N.Y.
at 236, 135 N.E. at 275, Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85, and distinguishing Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at
170, 174 N.E. at 441, and Pennsylvania precursor, Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783
(1919); § 552 not mentioned), affd inpart, remanded in part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 569 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H.
898, 451 A.2d 1308 (1982) (trade creditor, unaudited financial statements; on certification of
questions from federal district court in diversity case of first impression under New Hampshire
law; following other specifically foreseen person opinions and § 552); Tiffany Indus., Inc. v.
Harbor Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 432, 434 (W.D. Mo. 1982); 999 v. Cox & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1026,
1031 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (following Aluma Kraft, 493 S.W.2d at 378, under Missouri law); see
Commonwealth opinions involving acquisition of client: Dimond Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, [1969]
N.Z.L.R. 1609 (N.Z. Ct. App.) (inventory overvaluation; defendant-auditor liable, following
Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465); Toromont Indus. Holdings Ltd. v. Thorne, Gunn, Helliwell
& Christenson, 62 D.L.R.3d 225, 247, 252 (Ont. High Ct. 1975) (auditor negligent in expressing
audit opinion without audit, but insufficient evidence was presented of causal relation between
negligence and substantial damages because of evidence that plaintiff would have completed
acquisition anyway; following Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465, and dissent in Candler, [1951]
1 All E.R. at 428), modified, 73 D.L.R.3d 122, 124 (Ont. Ct. App. 1976) (awarding plaintiff
damages but only to extent of cost of new audit plus any related legal expenses).
19 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979) (applying Nebraska and Indiana law).
Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
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attachment to the defendant's affidavit of notes to the financial statements prepared by the accountant. These notes disclosed that the
plaintiff, in addition to being a creditor and the person responsible for
the client's incorporation in Indiana,"' held an option to purchase up
to eighty percent ownership of the client. In light of these revelations,
the plaintiff might well have asserted a reasonable case for being a
specifically foreseen person.
The Seedkem court primarily cited foreseen person precedents
and section 552 as eroding the viability of Ultramares.8 2 The court was
"doubtful that the plaintiff [would] be able to recover under the
extreme circumstances presented herein. '83 Although technically denying the accountant's motion to dismiss the complaint, the court
actually (and intentionally) decided nothing, by deferring the issue for
discovery "to ascertain whether any express representationswere actually made between the parties or any understandings existed between
those involved. 84 The court suggested that the accountant reassert his
motion as a motion for summary judgment according to the evidence
obtained in discovery, "on the issue of the accountant's representations. '8 5 It is reasonable to infer from the above quotations and other
language contained in the opinion that the court was applying an
actually foreseen person standard of duty.
2. Specifically Foreseen Limited Class
Compared with the rather tidy group of foreseen person opinions, the foreseen. class opinions are a motley assortment with an
obscure message. The particular question, which is not particularly
answered, is-"what is a class, and by what criteria are its limits
measured"-or, "what is not a class and by what criteria is this
determined?"
The only opinion which seems reasonable, Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand,86 is rather thin in content. In that
case, four individual plaintiffs were general partners of the captioned
plaintiff, through which they were limited partners in two similar

81 Id. at 343.

Id. at 342-43 (citing Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85 and Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 395). The
I8
opinion also referred once to the "foreseeable" plaintiff, but in the context of the foreseen. Id. at
342; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
83 Id. at 344.
84 Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 345 n.5.
16 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982).
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partnerships with a single identical general partner. Defendant performed auditing and other services for the latter two partnerships.
The two partnerships collapsed, and their auditors were sued for
alleged negligence by the Haddon View partnership and its four
partners.87 The court concluded that plaintiff-limited partners "constitute[d] a limited class of investors whose reliance on the accountant's certified audits . .. was specifically foreseen by defendant."88
The reasoning consisted of the supposed though mistaken "rejection"
of Ultramaresin White, a few foreseen class precedents,89 and section
552.90
One questions whether Haddon View should really be classified
as a foreseen person case, and why instead the court described it as a
foreseen limited class case. Was the class defined as the four limited
partners because (1) they were the only limited partners, and (2) the
allegedly negligent services were performed after they became partners? Or were they induced to become partners in reliance upon
allegedly negligent services? Are actual partners one limited class and
potential partners another, larger class? The opinion offers no clear
answer to these questions.
Another case which discusses foreseen limited classes, but which
throws little light on the subject, is Merit Insurance Co. v. Colao,91 a
diversity case governed by Illinois law. In Merit, a casualty insurance
company sued the auditors of its defunct agent for negligence. The
auditors had had reason to believe that the agent's audited financial
statements might be used in an underwritten financing or organization of a new insurance company, or in the negotiation of a new
agency agreement with any of numerous insurance companies, as it
had with the plaintiff.9 2 In ruling on motions at the pleading stage,
the court declined to hold that the alleged class of insurance companies providing insurance of the kind the agent sold (which could have
been much broader than casualty) was too broad or general to be an
appropriately defined limited class. 93 It also declined to hold that the
alleged class was too broad to satisfy the controlling Illinois precedent.

Id.
88 Id. at 157, 436 N.E.2d at 215.
89 Id. at 156, 436 N.E.2d at 214 (citing Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291
(1976); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425
U.S. 185 (1976)).
9O Id.
91 603 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
91 Id. at 657-59.
91 Id. at 659.
87
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Under that precedent, the nonclient liability of a negligent surveyor
was limited to a small group of successive owners of the surveyed land,
94
of which only one (the plaintiff) would normally suffer loss.
Finally, there is the case of Haig v. Bamford.95 Although Haig is
an opinion of the Canadian Supreme Court which cited United Kingdom and Canadian precedent, it is more oriented to (or, perhaps more
accurately, disoriented by) United States law. In that case, a defendant-auditor had reason to believe that the negligently audited financial statements of his client would be furnished to the client's lenders
and to prospective equity investors, one of whom proved to be the
plaintiff.96 The opinion discussed Ultramares,Glanzer, several specifically foreseen person opinions, section 552, and United States law
commentaries. 97 After so doing, it arrived at two incongruous conclusions: (1) the defendant-auditor was aware that his client intended to
furnish its audited financial statements to "a limited number of potential investors"-"a very limited class" 98-and plaintiff was a member
of that class; and (2) "the case before us is closer to Glanzer than to
Ultramares.-99
The Haig court came to these conclusions despite the fact that,
unlike the buyer and weigher of the beans in Glanzer, the plaintiff in
this case was no more known to the defendant-auditor than was the
Ultramares plaintiff to its defendant-auditor. It is the only reported
judicial opinion involving accountants that applies, or purports to
apply, Glanzer to a foreseen limited class. Moreover, the opinion
furnishes no guidance on the limitation of the supposedly limited
number of potential investors. Without some objective criteria for
determining limitations, is it reasonable, from common experience, to
describe potential investors as a very limited class? Or do such investors perhaps belong in a foreseeable class-if not the unlimited class of
the public? In the apparent absence of criteria, the announced definitions of class will be affected by the differing views of the judiciary
concerning the conduct of defendants.

Id. (citing Rozny v. Marnul, 43 I11.
2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969)).
" 72 D.L.R.3d 68 (Can. 1976).
96 Id. at 70.
" See id.at 75-80 (citing W. PaossEa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 706-09 (4th ed.
1971); Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85, and Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz,
Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972)).
98 Id. at 76, 80.
99 Id. at 78.
14
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3. Distortion of Specifically Foreseen Limited Class
The most egregious example of the application of the specifically
foreseen limited class rule is the Minnesota case of Bonhiver v.
Graft, 0 0 in which the term was distorted beyond recognition. The
defendant-accountant in Bonhiver was engaged to bring the accounts
of an insurance company up to date, but not to produce financial
statements.1 0' The defendant's employer made his workpapers available to state insurance examiners, who relied on them. The employee
negligently had failed to detect a massive embezzlement by company
officers (detectable from large discrepancies in intercompany account
balances), which ultimately rendered the company insolvent.10 2 The
state insurance commissioner, as receiver of the company, was authorized by the state insurance statute'0 3 to sue the accountants. The
commissioner was authorized to sue not only in his receiver role as
successor to the client, 10 4 in which he would have been exposed to
meritorious defenses against the client itself, 105 but as "representative"
of the creditors, "agent" of the policyholders, and "agent" of the
company's general agents. 0 An insurance agent who had become a
general agent of the insurance company intervened in the action,
seeking damages resulting from his reliance upon the commissioner's
assurances (based upon defendant's representations) of the company's
07
insolvency.
The Bonhiver court applied what it considered to be the specifically foreseen limited class doctrine, declining to follow Ultramares,
and choosing to follow primarily specifically foreseen person precedents and section 552.108 As to the scope of the limited class, the court
stated:
100311

Minn. 111, 248 N.W.2d 291 (1976).
101Id. at 115, 119, 248 N.W.2d at 295, 297.
1o2 Id. at 115-16, 248 N.W.2d at 295-96.
10' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60B.04 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
104 For examples of suits brought by receivers of clients against accountants, see MacKethan v.
Burrus, Cootes & Burrus, 545 F.2d 1388, 1389 (4th Cir. 1976) (receiver an assignee of claims by
operation of law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir.
1973) (FDIC as both receiver and insurer-subrogee of defunct credit union), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); In re Hawaii Corp., 567 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Hawaii 1983) (bankruptcy
trustee as successor-in-interest); Shapiro v. Glekel, 380 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (bankruptcy trustee stands in shoes of corporation).
10s In a case, similar to Bonhiver, of massive fraud by a client's management, an allegedly
negligent defendant-auditor was held not liable to the client for damages. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman
& Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.) (Illinois law), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 177 (1982).
"0 See Bonhiver, 311 Minn. at 118, 126, 128, 248 N.W.2d at 296, 301, 302.
107 Id. at 116, 248 N.W.2d at 295-96. The court found that "the Commissioner's [contributory] negligence was, at most, concurrent but not intervening." Id. at 119, 248 N.W.2d at 297.
100 Id., 248 N.W.2d at 297-99 (citing Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85, and Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at
395).
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As is indicated above, the extent of an accountant's liability for
malpractice is not settled. If that liability is to be drawn somewhere
short of foreseeability, it must be drawn on pragmatic grounds
alone.
Wherever the line will eventually be drawn between those
who can recover from the negligent accountant and those who
cannot, we feel that on the facts of this case [intervening plaintiffgeneral agent] falls on the side of those who can recover. 09

In other words, the class was to be drawn broadly enough to include
the intervening plaintiffs, even though it made a travesty of the
foreseen class concept."10
At the present time, the prevailing criterion of a negligent accountant's liability to nonclients is the specifically foreseen person and
limited class test. This is sometimes expressed as an explicit avowal of
section 552, and sometimes as a more liberal reinterpretation of Ultramares and Glanzer. Two recent state supreme court decisions,"' however, have opted to expand the scope of accountant's liability to a class
new to this area of the law-the class of the reasonably foreseeable.

II. THE

FORESEEABLE

Apparently in anticipation of future skirmishes over foreseeability, the first reported opinions in negligence cases against accountants

101Id. at

129-31, 248 N.W.2d at 302-03 (footnote omitted).
"10With Bonhiver as the law in Minnesota, a defendant-auditor in a recent Minnesota case
was obliged to go to trial on its defense of reasonable care in a negligence class action on behalf of
customers of its client; the auditor, however, won a verdict from the jury. Jenson v. Touche Ross
& Co., No. 737808 (Minn. D.Ct. Jan. 15, 1981), aff'd, 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983) (affirmed
on appeal from evidence rulings in negligence action, and on statutory counts). In another recent
case, the court, in ruling on a common-law negligence claim against auditors pendent to a
federal securities law class action, stated without any explanation, that "the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 supports liability of accountants to public shareholders." Zatkin v. Primuth,
551 F. Supp. 39, 46 (S.D. Cal. 1982) (emphasis added). Since the court was referring to the
"entire class" of plaintiffs at whom the motion to dismiss was directed,
it is impossible to
rationalize that cryptic statement under § 552. The issue was the last in a very long series of
preliminary motions examined and denied or granted in a single opinion. As commonly seems to
happen to comparatively minor pendent common-law claims in federal securities law actions,
defendant-auditor may have suffered the consequences of judicial exhaustion, or possibly the
indifference that some federal judges seem to reveal toward pendent common-law counts in
federal litigation.
"I H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v.
Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 388, 335 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1983).
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to endorse and apply section 552 of the Restatement, finding
that defendant-accountants had actually foreseen plaintiff's reliance, expressly disassociated the foreseeability issue.112 In some
cases against accountants, once plaintiffs were determined to be members only of a foreseeable class rather than a specifically foreseen class,
their negligence claims were dismissed forthwith. Such was the situation in suits by customers of a securities brokerage firm," 3 and by
purchasers of a client's shares in a public offering and in the public
over-the-counter aftermarket.1 4 Consequently, prior to 1983, accountants were not held liable to plaintiffs whose reliance, though
foreseeable, was not specifically foreseen.1 5 In that year, however,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler" 6 took
a different view.
The plaintiffs in Rosenblum alleged negligence by the auditor in
failing to detect a large-scale management fraud" 17 when auditing its
"I Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 93 ("The Court . . . leaves open for reconsideration . . . the
question of whether an accountant's liability for negligent misrepresentation ought to extend to
the full limits of foreseeability"); Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 403 ("It is unnecessary at this time to
determine whether the rule of no liability should be relaxed to extend to all foreseeable persons
who may rely upon the report, but we do hold it should be relaxed as to those who were actually
known to the author as prospective users of the report and take into consideration the end and
aim of the transaction." (emphasis added)).
"I Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir, 1974) (negligence claim under
Illinois law pendent to federal securities law action; no specific discussion of foreseeability), rev'd
on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
14 Shofstall v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 351, 359-60 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (negligence
claim under Illinois law pendent to § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 action under Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), respectively; following
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); no specific discussion of foreseeability nor of investors in public market);
Denbeste v. Meriwether, Wilson & Strick, No. 74-35-D, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 2, 1981)
(negligence claim under Iowa law pendent to federal securities law action; foreseeability discussed; following Ryan, 170 N..W.2d at 395).
"I One exception to this is California, which appears to be receptive to the notion of the
foreseeability standard. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 233 n. 1 (citing Swiss Bank Corp. v. Touche
Ross & Co., No. 161 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 1977) (verdict for plaintiff on court's instruction
which included negligence and foreseeability standard), settled pending appeal, Swiss Bank
Corp. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 18057 (Cal. Ct. App. stipulated reversal June 1980)). See also
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1572(2) (West 1982); id. § 1710(2) (West 1973), in which negligent misrepresentations (such as negligently issued audit opinions), but not negligent omissions or acts, are
defined in effect as forms of fraud or deceit without scienter.
16 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
"7 The repercussions of the management fraud were considerable as evidenced by the litigation which ensued: (1) claims of $100 million in eight lawsuits against the defendant-auditors, H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 422, 444 A.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); (2) administrative censure of the auditor
(with the auditor's consent) by SEC finding a failure to meet certain generally accepted auditing
standards established by the profession relating to the audit of the 1972 financial statements,
SEC Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 153A, [7 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Ra'. (CCH)
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client's 1971 and 1972 financial statements." 8 The two individual
plaintiffs also alleged reliance on the audited financial statements in
selling their businesses to the client in exchange for shares of the client
which became worthless after the fraud was discovered. The trial
court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the defendantauditor as to the 1971 audit, but not as to the 1972 audit.1 19
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court faced facts and applied legal reasoning similar to that applied
in other accountants' liability cases. The court discussed the retreat by
most jurisdictions from the strict privity of contract defense of Ultramares, cited approvingly the specifically foreseen person cases of more
recent years, discussed section 552, and concluded that:
We are of the view that the moderate rule as expressed in § 552 of
the Restatement, Torts 2d is the better view and we adopt it. We
hold that the liability of an accountant for negligence is to be
measured by a duty owed to one with whom he is in privity or one
of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he
intends to supply the information or to whom he knows the recipient of his report will supply it. However, even under this rule

72,175A, at 62,363-3 (1979); (3) criminal indictment and conviction of several of the client's
officers; see United States v. Kaufman, No. 77-135-S (D. Mass. Apr. 20, 1977); United States v.
Lieberman, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,167 (lst Cir. 1979).
"'
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 331, 461 A.2d at 141. The events leading to the suit began in
November 1971 when the auditor's client began negotiations with the plaintiffs for the acquisition of the plaintiffs' businesses. One month later the client made a public offering of its shares.
The prospectus of that offering included financial statements for the four years ending January
30, 1971. To each statement was affixed the auditor's unqualified opinion. Id. at 330, 461 A.2d
at 141. The plaintiffs, allegedly in reliance on the financial statements, subsequently agreed to
merge their businesses into the client in exchange for shares of the client. During the same
period, the auditor had commenced an audit of the client's financial statements for the year
ending January 29, 1972. Id. These audited financial statements, also accompanied by unqualified audit opinions, were issued in April 1972, and the merger was completed in June 1972.
Eight months later, it was revealed that the client had falsified its accounts, thus making it
apparent that the 1971 and 1972 financial statements were misstated. News of the fraud led to
the suspension and ultimate termination of trading in the client's stock. By September 1973 the
client had filed a petition in bankruptcy and as a result the plaintiffs' shares in the client became
worthless. Id. at 331, 461 A.2d at 141.
In addition to their allegation of negligence, the plaintiffs also charged the auditor with
fraudulent misrepresentation, gross negligence, and breach of warranty in their audits of the
1971 and 1972 financial statements. Id. at 332, 461 A.2d at 141.
11 The trial court ruled that the auditor could not be found liable for negligence in the 1971
audit because it was not aware of the existence of the plaintiffs at the time of the audit. Id. at
353, 461 A.2d at 153-54. As to the 1972 audit, the trial court found that the auditors had
knowledge of the merger agreement and that it had been employed by the client to conduct the
audit for the purpose of the merger. Id. at 356-57, 461 A.2d at 155-56.
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plaintiffs must fail. It is conceded that the merger was not contemplated for at least seven months after defendants' 1971 report was
completed and filed. When defendants prepared that 1971 audit
there was no suggestion that plaintiffs or any one of a similar
limited group would place reliance upon itfor merger purposes. 120
Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed partial summary judgment
for the defendant-auditor on the negligence count in connection with
the 1971 audit.' 2' Since it had denied defendant's motion for leave to
appeal the trial court's denial of partial summary judgment in connection with the 1972 audit, the lower court's ruling in that respect
remained intact.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in part, departing from
precedent by applying the reasonably foreseeable test against the
defendant-auditor. 2 2 The court ruled adversely on defendant's motions for summary judgment on the allegations of negligence in defendant's audits of both the 1971 and 1972 financial statements, reversing summary judgment on the 1971 audit, and affirming the trial
court's denial of summary judgment on the 1972 audit.123 As might be
expected, the court issued a somewhat lengthy opinion in explanation
of its departure from precedent.
In addressing the issue of the auditor's duty, the court cited the
following three principal terms: (1) privity or "known beneficiaries,"
attributed to Ultramares; (2) "a known and intended class of beneficiaries," citing section 552; and (3) reasonable foreseeability of reliance by the recipients of the audited financial statements.124 In connection with the third term, the court cited the recent United
Kingdom decision in JEB FastenersLtd. v. Marks, Bloom & Co., 25 in
which a negligent defendant-auditor had been held liable to a plaintiff whose reliance was found to have been reasonably foreseeable. In
other parts of the opinion, the court gave weight to additional United
Kingdom-Commonwealth opinions and to one English law review
article.126 Citation of those authorities is highly significant, because
120

H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 424, 444 A.2d 66, 70 (App. Div. 1982),

aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 93 N.J. 138, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
121 Id.
122 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352-53, 461 A.2d at 153.
123 Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 156.
124 Id.
",'[1981] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.), cited in Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 333, 352 n.14, 461 A.2d at
142, 153 n.14; see infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
126 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350-52 nn.12-14, 461 A.2d at 152-53 nn.12-14 (citing, e.g., Scott
Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553 (N.Z. Ct. App. 1977) (discussed infra notes
195-207); Stanton & Dugdale, Recent Developments in Professional Negligence-ll: Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 132 NEw L.J. 4 (1982)).
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neither plaintiffs nor defendant had briefed or argued them or any
other United Kingdom-Commonwealth authorities.
The court used familiar language and references in dealing with
Ultramares and the bean weighers' case.1 27 It turned to the general
rule imposing liability for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
negligence 128 as a prelude to discussing with approval its products
liability decisions awarding damages for both physical and economic
injury without a requirement of privity. 129 The court then proceeded
to analogize the negligent manufacture of a product to the negligent
issuance of an audit opinion:
Why should a claim of negligent misrepresentation be barred in the
absence of privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's claim also sounds in tort, but is based on liability for defects in
products arising out of a negligent misrepresentation? If recovery
for defective products may include economic loss, why should such
loss not be compensable if caused by negligent misrepresenta30
tion?
In this respect, the court's reasoning is grievously flawed. Courts
tend to become so taken with the similarities of an analogy that they
overlook the fact that the differences inherent in an analogy sometimes outweigh those similarities.' 3 ' A business enterprise has control
over, and responsibility for, the methods both by which it manufactures products and by which it maintains its accounting records. It
may or may not perform those processes adequately, but it controls
them, and no one else does. The independent auditor does not control
the client's accounting records and processes. In conformity with

...Id. at 337-39, 461 A.2d at 144-45. Also, the court cited once, id. at 337 n.3, 461 A.2d at
144 n.3, but otherwise ignored, the single judicial opinion construing New Jersey law on
auditors' liability to nonclients, in Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275, 308-10
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part, remandedin part on other grounds, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978). Significantly, the specifically foreseen person test of duty was
applied. Coleco, 423 F. Supp. at 310.
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 339, 461 A.2d at 145.
Id. at 339-41, 461 A.2d at 145-47 (citing Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,
I29
207 A.2d 305 (1965) (economic injury; no privity); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d
626 (1957) (physical injury; no privity); O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99
A.2d 577 (1953) (same)).
130 Id. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147.
' See Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 904, 451 A.2d 1308, 1312
(N.H. 1982) (like Rosenblum court, also taking products liability analogy for granted in case
against accountants). But see Minow, Special Report: Accountants Liability (Arthur Anderson &
Co. 1984) (noting fallacy of accountants' liability-product liability analogy).
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professional auditing standards, the auditor tests and analyzes the
financial statements that are the end result of the client's accounting
processes (whatever their infirmities), with a view toward expressing
his professional opinion on their quality. According to his findings, the
auditor recommends adjustments of the client's financial statements,
and when occasion requires, he insists on adjustments prior to issuing
an audit opinion satisfactory to the client. The auditor, however, is an
outsider; he is never as close to the accounting processes as the client's
general and accounting officers who govern these processes.' 3
Following its product liability comparison the court discussed at
some length the fairness, from a public interest perspective, of imposing a duty of foreseeability on accountants.1 33 In this regard, the court
attempted to minimize the continuing reliance on Ultramares, invoking a revisionist theory appearing in some of the literature 34 to the
effect that Ultramares is a relic from an age in which an "audit was
made primarily to inform management of irregularities and inefficiencies in the business.' 35 According to the court, the audit has since
evolved to meet, in addition, the needs of investors, lenders, suppliers,
and the government.1 36 The court's description of this as a postUltramares development is refuted in the very text of the Ultramares
opinion, in which Chief Judge Cardozo recognized the potential for
the audit to be used in a variety of related transactions. Regarding the
client, the Chief Judge wrote:
To finance its operations, it required extensive credit and borrowed
large sums of money from banks and other lenders. All this was
known to the defendants. The defendants knew also that in the
usual course of business the balance sheet when certified would be
exhibited by the [client] to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers, or sellers, according to the needs of the occasion, as the
132 Although in matters of adequate financial statement disclosure of what is known to auditor
and client alike, rather than of what and how much is reasonably determinable by the auditor
through adequate testing and analysis, the auditor, as an expert professional, has a responsibility
commensurate with that of the client in requiring adequate disclosure as a condition of issuance
of a favorable audit opinion. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
133 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 341-53, 461 A.2d at 147-53. See infra notes 218-34 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the court's treatment of the fairness issue, including the extent
of the burden on professional accountants of exposure to such a degree of liability, and the
insurability of the risk.
'31 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 345-46, 461 A.2d at 149: see Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant &
Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903-04, 451 A.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1982) (auditor-defendant; modern accounting profession no longer in need of judicial protection provided by Ultramares to a then
"fledgling profession").
135 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 345, 461 A.2d at 149.
136 Id. at 345-47, 461 A.2d at 149-50.
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The range of the transactions in

which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a part was as
indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the business that was
mirrored in the summary. 137
Consequently, the court's attempt to characterize the fairness of expanding the scope of accountant's liability as a function of modern
developments in the use of the audit opinion is erroneous.
In a similarly unconvincing attempt to justify its reasoning, the
court suggested that "[t]he accounting firm could seek indemnification or contribution from the company and those blameworthy officers and employees.' 38 As a practical matter, the very case over
which the court was presiding was representative of many and possibly most such circumstances, that is, those in which legal recourse
would yield little or no financial recompense. Apparently nothing in
the record of the case drew the court's attention to the fact that
negotiation by an auditor of a contractual right of indemnification by
or on behalf of the client would disqualify the auditor from serving as
independent auditor of the client. 3 9 A contractual right of contribution would probably have the same result, since contribution is akin to
indemnification. Moreover, federal courts, although generally receptive to tort contribution, have uniformly denied indemnification in
federal securities law cases. 40 Therefore, the court's suggestion is not
really feasible.
The opinion also suggested the availability of disclaimers of liability and restrictions on the use of and reliance on audit opinions "in
some circumstances, such as when auditing a privately owned company.' 14 ' The suggestion is impractical for professional accountants,
even though some other professionals, such as lawyers, can occasionally disclaim or limit reliance and responsibility in opinions in private
transactions. In any case, those tactics and others, such as diluting the
substance of audit opinions, would be attended with social disutilities
that would make them unattractive to the court and to everyone else.

138

Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.

139

SEC, Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02i.i, 5

137

FED.

SEC.

L.

REP.

(CCH) 73,274 at 62,913 (originally, Accounting Series Release No. 22 (1941)).
140 For additional discussion of indemnity and contribution in federal securities law cases, see
R. GORMLEY, THE LAW OF ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS 1 12.03, 12.04 (1981).
"I Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152 (citing Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465, in
which bank avoided liability for negligence by disclaiming responsibility in furnishing credit
information without charge).
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In addition, the relevance of the suggestion in a controversy involving
a publicly owned company is obscure.
Finally, the Rosenblum court seriously underestimated the scope
of foreseeable plaintiffs to whom an auditor would in all probability
be exposed for negligence:
Thus, for example, an institutional investor or portfolio manager
who does not obtain audited statements from the company would
not come within the stated principle. Nor would stockholders who
purchased the stock after a negligent audit be covered in the absence of demonstrating the necessary conditions precedent. Those
and similar cases beyond the stated rule are not before us and we
42
express no opinion with respect to such situations.
This overly-bold conjecture is prudently hedged with the final sentence of disclaimer. The statement fails to take into account the
characteristic thoroughness of institutional investors, aided by counsel, in obtaining documentation, including financial statements and
audit opinions, that would support a strong case that the investors'
reliance on the audit opinions was actually foreseen by the auditors.
Resourceful counsel can be expected to make admirably persuasive
appeals that all of their respective clients-shareholders, debentureholders, suppliers, customers, and possibly tax-gatherers and other
government bodies as well-justifiably relied either on the financial
statements and audit opinion received by them or seen by them, or on
the knowledge in the community of the company's apparent solidity,
attested to by its financial statements and auditor's opinion. 143 Indeed,
the Rosenblum court subsequently pointed out a number of uses that
the defendant-auditor should have known would (or might) be made
of its audit opinion, among them obtaining credit, and that a copy
would be sent to each shareholder with the financial statements. The
court observed that "[t]hese were clearly foreseeable potential uses of
the audited financials at the time of their preparation.' ' 44 Such a
statement illustrates the internal inconsistency of the court's conception of the scope and limitations of foreseeability, and the confusion
that courts will be forced to endure in future attempts to apply the
standard.
Although one might have expected the opinion to conclude at
that point, the court evidently felt the need to justify its denials of
Id. at 352-53, 461 A.2d at 153.
As to the latter, compare the "fraud-on-the-market" opinions in some of the federal
securities law cases, starting with Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (codefendant-auditor), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
144 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 355, 461 A.2d at 154.
142
143
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summary judgment by offering a review of the relevant allegations
and other facts then in contention concerning the audits of the 1971
and 1972 financial statements.1 45 Two important points in the court's
own summation, however, suggest that consideration of the foreseeability issue may have been unnecessary, and that the court might
reasonably have supported its denial on a theory that the two individual plaintiffs, who merged their businesses into defendant's client in
exchange for its shares, were in fact specifically foreseen persons.
First, although negotiation of the merger did not commence until
six months after completion of the 1971 audit, defendant's audit engagement partner was present at the merger negotiations, and participated in them. 146 United States opinions appear to reject the proposition that a duty to specifically foreseen persons may arise so
belatedly,1 47 but there exists Commonwealth precedent that a "special
relationship" is established upon contact between an auditor of the
client's business and a purchaser of the business, 148 even though the
contract is subsequent to the audit, provided it is prior to the purchase.
Second, although the merger agreement in Rosenblum had been
signed and delivered before the 1972 financial statements and audit
opinion were issued, the agreement contained a customary representation, warranty, and condition of closing that there would be no
material adverse change in the acquiring client's business, property,

Id. at 353-57, 461 A.2d at 153-56.
at 353-56, 461 A.2d at 153-55.
147 Koch Indus.,
Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 725 (10th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff-purchaser of
stock of client not specifically foreseen person, because audit had been performed for earlier
proposed purchaser); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981) ("the risk to be
perceived at the time of the undertakingdefines the nature of the duty of ordinary care owed to
third parties" (emphasis added)); Denbeste v. Meriwether, Wilson & Strick, No. 74-35-D (S.D.
Iowa Sept. 2, 1981) (following Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 395, and Koch, 494 F.2d at 713, in
negligence claim under Iowa law pendent to federal securities law action); Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at
403 (duty of care to specifically foreseen person, "especially when the party to be benefitted is
identified before the statement or report is submitted by the accountant").
148 Dimond Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, [1969] N.Z.L.R. 609, 629 (N.Z. Ct. App.) (special
relationship created under Hedley Byrne when previously audited financial statements were
shown by partner of negligent auditor to plaintiff at client's request for reliance in purchase of
client; court ruled that tort is complete only when acted upon by representee); Toromont Indus.
Holdings Ltd. v. Thorne, Gunn, Helliwell & Christenson, 62 D.L.R.3d 225, 247 (Ont. High Ct.
1975) (relationship created by personal contact after completion of audit but before closing of
acquisition of client in which negligently audited financial statements were used in determining
purchase price), modified, 73 D.L.R.3d 122 (Ont. Ct. App. 1976); cf. JEB Fasteners Ltd. v.
Marks, Bloom & Co., [1980] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.) (similar to Dimond on facts, but finding of
duty based on foreseeability theory).
145

146 Id.
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or assets prior to the time of closing, which was after the time of
issuance.14 9 Subject to evidence on disputed factual issues, the court
considered it reasonably foreseeable that plaintiffs would rely in part
on the audited financial statements in consummating the merger. 50
The court's own statement again suggests that the plaintiffs may have
been specifically foreseen persons, and one must question whether the
trial court may also have concluded this in its denial of summary
judgment on the 1972 audit which the supreme court affirmed.
The essential facts are as follows: the defendant based its brief
and argument on Ultramares; the plaintiffs based their brief and
argument on section 552; the court, of its own accord, researched the
United Kingdom-Commonwealth precedents, and as a consequence
based its argument upon foreseeability. The court, of course, won the
argument.
Less than a month after issuance of the Rosenblum opinion, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt &
Co.' 5 1 also denied summary judgment to a defendant-auditor and its
insurer, on negligence allegations by a lender to the auditor's client. In
a more prosaic opinion than Rosenblum, the court began by disposing
of Ultramares. It pointed to the trend toward elimination of a privity
requirement, and cited the specifically foreseen person cases of Rusch,
Ryan, and a recent Wisconsin decision holding a negligent attorney
liable to a beneficiary of the will of his deceased client.1 52
The court also quoted and discussed section 552, but regarded its
scope as too restrictive to be compatible with a general Wisconsin rule
that makes no distinction between negligent acts and negligent misrepresentations. The court simply stated that "a tortfeasor is fully
liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those consequences are limited by policy factors."' 53 Accordingly, the court,
citing the Rosenblum decision for additional support, found that the
defendant-auditors could be held liable for the foreseeable conse-

149 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 356-57, 461 A.2d at 155; accord Toromont Indus. Holdings Ltd. v.
Thorne, Gunn, Helliwell & Christenson, 62 D.L.R.3d 225, 247 (Ont. High Ct. 1975), modified,
73 D.L.R.3d 122 (Ont. Ct. App. 1976).
"'0 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 356-57, 461 A.2d at 155-56.
,5-113 Wis. 2d 376, 388, 335 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1983). A Wisconsin statute gives an injured
person a direct right of action against a negligence insurer, in common with a few other
jurisdictions and in reversal of the general common-law rule. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West
1980). The result is a tendency to prejudice both the alleged tortfeasor and co-defendant insurer,
especially in a jury case.
5I Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 383-84, 335 N.W.2d at 364-65 (citing Auric v.
Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983)).
153 Id. at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
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quences of their negligent misrepresentations, as long as public policy
54
did not dictate otherwise.
Among the public policy reasons for not imposing liability despite
negligence, the court mentioned the disproportion of the injury to
culpability and the potential for imposing unreasonable burdens on
the defendant. 55 It failed, however, to evaluate the relevance of
public policy questions in the case, because it is Wisconsin practice to
defer consideration of public policy questions until after full development of the facts at trial of the negligence issue. 156 Accordingly, the
court remanded the case for trial.
III.

BEYOND THE FORESEEABLE-THE UNLIMITED CLASS OF THE PUBLIC

Courts have not ruled directly on the issue of whether a negligent
accountant may be held liable to persons who are members of the
general public, but whose reliance is not reasonably foreseeable to the
accountant. Some courts, however, appear to have attempted to draw
a distinction between these two classes. In an action by potential
investors in a public offering of securities, one court stated that "plaintiffs are members of a potentially unlimited class of investors in defendants' client which could not reasonably have been ascertained by
the defendant accountants when the latter agreed to render accounting services to [their client] ... "157 Similarly, in a case in which the
defendant-auditor did not know of the prospect of subsequent investment by plaintiffs in the client, the court summed up the distinction as
follows:
We are of the opinion that the lack of privity is not a defense where
an accountant . . .isaware of the fact that his work will be relied
on by a party or parties who may extend credit to his client or
assume his client's obligations. A future purchaser of shares of stock
of a corporation, however, belongs to an unlimited class of equity
holders who could not be reasonably foreseen as a third party who
would be expected to rely on a financial statement prepared by an
accountant for the corporation.

154

58

Id.

155Id. at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
158Id., 335 N.W.2d at 366-67.
157 Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (negligence claim under Iowa
law, pendent to federal securities law action).
151 Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).

1984]

ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY TO NONCLIENTS

559

Also, in another suit against auditors, the court held that plaintiffsureties on a construction contract were "merely members of the
public" in relying on the contractor's audited financial statements. 59
Nevertheless, these decisions fail to establish a distinction between the foreseeable class and the class of the general public. The
obscurity of the distinction is illustrated by successive lower and appellate court opinions in a New Zealand case. 160 In that case the
defendant-auditor, who had been negligent in its audit of a publicly
owned client, was unaware at the time of his audit that the plaintiff
was preparing to purchase all of the client's shares in reliance on
various published data, including the client's audited financial statements published and filed in a government office pursuant to statute. 1 1 The lower court regarded the plaintiff as a member of the
public, and declined to accept the argument that anyone dealing in
the public market in shares of a publicly owned company in reliance
on its financial statements could claim a special relationship with
negligent auditors of the company. 6 2 In reversing the lower court, all
three members of the court of appeals concluded that transactions
such as the plaintiff's should have been reasonably foreseeable to the
6 3
auditors.
The distinction between a reasonably foreseeable class and the
general public became blurred in an opinion concerning plaintiff
"general investors," who invested in defendant-auditor's client in alleged reliance upon the audited financial statements in the client's
prospectus. 6 4 The court first stated that plaintiffs were "merely forseeable [sic] at the time the statements were examined,"165 and were
not " 'actually foreseen and limited classes of persons' "116 entitled to
recourse against a negligent auditor. Having determined that there
was no liability, the court then proceeded to obscure the distinction
between foreseeable persons and the general public by lumping the
two groups together and observing that a broader interpretation of

"I Dworman v. Lee, 83 A.D.2d 507, 507, 441 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd mem.,
56 N.Y.2d 816, 438 N.E.2d 103, 56 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1982).
11 Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 582 (N.Z.S.C.), afJ'd on other grounds,
[1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553 (N.Z. Ct. App. 1977).
l61 Id. at 586; Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553, 556 (N.Z. Ct. App.
1977).
162 Scott Group, [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 587, 590.
1' Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553, 566, 575, 582 (N.Z. Ct. App.
1977).
'
Denbeste v. Meriwether, Wilson & Strick, No. 73-35-D (S.D. Iowa Sept. 2, 1981).
"'
Id. slip op. at 4.
Id. (quoting Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 402).
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liability "would subject an accountant to suits initiated by investors
whom he or she could not reasonably have contemplated at the time a
financial statement was compiled or examined on behalf of the clients/
issuer.' 1 67 The court concluded that there was "not ... a duty of care
on the part of accountants to a potentially unlimited class of investors
68
in a corporate client."'
In support of a foreseeability standard of responsibility, it has
been suggested that such a standard would eliminate the difficulties in
distinguishing between the specifically foreseen and the reasonably
foreseeable. 6 9 This suggestion, however, ignores the reality that all of
the terms discussed above-end and aim, primary beneficiary, specifically (or actually or known) foreseen person, foreseen limited class,
reasonably foreseeable class, and unlimited class or the public-are
labels attached to a continuum of behavior that blends together by
infinity of degree. There has been little judicial examination thus far
of the distinction between the reasonably foreseeable class and the
unlimited class or public, because until recently there has been no
legal need to make the distinction. The opinions cited above evidence
this indistinctness. Drawing a distinction between the reasonably foreseeable class and the unlimited class of the public could well prove
more difficult than discerning a distinction between the specifically
foreseen and reasonably foreseeable classes. It is complicated by the
fact that, in the face of the void created, plaintiffs could be expected
to argue that the reasonably foreseeable class is unlimited.
IV.

UNITED KINGDOM AND COMMONWEALTH DECISIONS

In this area of law, United States and United Kingdom-Commonwealth decisions each have been influenced perceptibly by the
other, perhaps more than many United States lawyers realize. Some of
the important United Kingdom-Commonwealth opinions have been
influenced by Ultramares, Glanzer, section 552, and specifically foreseen person opinions. 17 0 Likewise, some of the influential United
167

8

Id.

slip op. at 5.

Id. (emphasis added).

le Note, supra note 2, at 608.
10 E.g., Donaghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.). In Donaghue, a justice stated: "It is
always satisfaction to an English lawyer to be able to test his application of fundamental
principles of the common law by the development of the same doctrines by the lawyers of the
courts of the United States." Id. at 598 (citing with approval "the illuminating judgment of
CARDOZO, C.J." in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
MacPherson and an earlier New York products liability opinion were approved in another
majority opinion, id. at 617, but were distinguished in a dissenting opinion as "'dangerous
article" cases. Id. at 577.
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States opinions have drawn support from Hedley Byrne and the Candler dissent. Perhaps most significantly, Rosenblum reveals the influence of recent United Kingdom and Commonwealth opinions that
subject accountants to a duty of care to those whose reliance is reasonably foreseeable.
There are problems in achieving adequate understanding of the
character and background of authority in foreign jurisdictions. One
problem, visible on the surface, is communication-inadequate
awareness of the resources of other common-law jurisdictions, and
difficulty of access to and maintenance of the increasingly massive
library materials of the various jurisdictions. 171 Other difficulties arise
from different meanings and nuances of words in a common language, especially those words and expressions that have become terms
of art in some jurisdictions, but merely appear to be conversational in
others. Differing modes of thought, expression, and reference present
difficulties in interpretation. Political, social, and economic differences can make it equally difficult to grasp context and background
adequately. Accordingly, United States lawyers experience difficulty
in synthesizing accurately the conclusions implied or expressed in
different ways in the seriatim opinions of justices in the highest United
Kingdom and Commonwealth courts.
The Hedley Byrne opinions 172 are illustrative. There, the defendant bank gratuitously, but negligently, furnished inaccurate credit
information concerning one of its customers to a second bank. The
plaintiff, a customer of the second bank, relied on the misinformation
in extending credit, to its loss. 173 The case has been known in the
United States for the justices' description of the terms "special relationship" and "special duty," which United States lawyers have
tended to regard as an equivalent of the specifically foreseen person
and limited class generality of the Restatement. 174 The matter, however, proves to be far more complex.

17' The inefficiencies in communication reveal themselves in varying degree in judicial opinions from both the United States and United Kingdom. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
503 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1974) (relying on the
Candler majority 11 years after its express disapproval); Grover Indus. Holdings, Ltd. v.
Newman Harris & Co. (Jan. 12, 1976) (unreported) (discussed in JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks,
Bloom & Co., [1981] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.), afJ'd, [198311 All E.R. 583 (C.A.) (trial court in
1976 case considered itself precluded from its preferred conclusion by Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at
170, 174 N.E. at 441, and other opinions which were unnamed)).
"2 Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 465.
171 Id. at 469.
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, comment h, illustration 11, at 135-36 (1977)
(illustration contains the Hedley Byrne facts except for the absence of a disclaimer of liability);
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United States lawyers have tended to criticize the diffuse opinions
in Hedley Byrne as failing to communicate any clear message. 75 To
the contrary, a patient study of the long and multiple opinions in
Hedley Byrne and in other United Kingdom-Commonwealth negligence appeals cases reveals a conception of duty that is reasonably
coherent, but is different in articulation and to some degree in content
from that of the Restatement, and therefore is not so readily recognizable to United States lawyers.
First, the modes of thought and expression are different. The
terms "special relationship" and "special duty," which seem so pallid
and uninformative in the abstract, absorb meaning and color in the
context of illustration and metaphor. They derive still more meaning
when associated in a specific manner with other terms in the context
of their illustration and metaphor. Second, recent United KingdomCommonwealth opinions reveal that, unlike the Restatement rules
which have broad and general applicability, the content of those
terms is affected in different cases by the facts in each individual
controversy.
In recognition of those observations, a study of Hedley Byrne
shows that the number of references to a special relationship and
special duty is exceeded by the number of references to "proximity,"
which in turn is occasionally associated with the homely and seemingly conversational term "neighbour." All of those expressions gradually emerged, in Hedley Byrne and other opinions, as legal terms of
art, with a body of meaning that is well understood by United Kingdom-Commonwealth jurists and practitioners.
Some of the statements in Hedley Byrne amplify the terms "special relationship" and "duty." For example, "special relationships
... include . . . relationships which . . . are 'equivalent to contract'[;] that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in
circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there
would be a contract. ' 176 Also:
[I]f . . .where a person is so placed that others could reasonably
rely on his judgment or his skill . . .such person takes it on himself
to give information or advice to, or allows his information or
advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows, or

Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851
(4th Cir. 1972).
175 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
17' Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 528-29.
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should know, will place reliance on it, then a duty of care will
arise. 177
And: "[It is] not . . .possible to catalogue the special features which
must be found to exist before the duty of care will arise in a given
178
"....
case
Other statements discuss the terms "proximity" and "neighbour"
in relation to special relationships and duty. One of the justices defined the "principle of proximity" as holding that: "You must take
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. 1 79 Another spoke of
the "degree of proximity necessary to establish a [special] relationship
giving rise to a duty of care." 80 A third said that "special relationship
[is] derived . . .from the notion of proximity . ..or from those .. .
possessing a special skill [, who] are under a duty to exercise it with
reasonable care.' ' 81 Further, professionals "have a duty of skill and
care. In terms of proximity one might say that they are .. .particularly close . ..to those who, as they know, are relying on their skill
' 82
and care, although the proximity is not contractual.'
Additional statements emphasize the fluidity and factual orientation of the duty concept. "[T]he law can be developed to solve particular problems. Is the relationship between the parties in this case such
that it can be brought within a category giving rise to a special
duty?" 83 Quoting a celebrated 1932 products liability decision, a
justice stated that: " 'The categories of negligence are never closed.'
English law is wide enough to embrace any new category or proposi' 84
tion that exemplifies the principle of proximity.'

177

Id. at 514.

178

Id.

179Id. at 524 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion in Candler, [1951] 1 All E.R. at 426,
also speaks of "proximity," id. at 434, and "close and direct," id. at 428, 433.
180 Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 488.
181 Id. at 505 (citing Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (Lord Esher, M.R.), as origin of
concept of proximity).
182 Id. at 538.
183 Id. at 525.
114 Id. at 531 (quoting Donaghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 619 (H.L.)). Donaghue, a
products liability case, was an important influence in the cases discussed in this section. In that
case, a manufacturer of ginger-beer (not an inherently dangerous article) was held liable in
negligence under Scots law (the same as English law on the issue) for the consequence of a
decomposed snail in the product consumed by plaintiff. Atkin, L.J., spoke of "proximity" as "not
confined to mere physical proximity, but . . . intended, to extend to such close and direct
relations that the act complained of directly affects a person whom the [first] person .. .would
know would be directly affected by his careless act." Id. at 581.
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The frustration of the Restatement reporter and others over the
"vagueness" of the opinions is understandable.1 85 But unlike the reporter, who was searching for an expression that would support a
clear-cut generality of broad scope and fairly well-defined bounds,
such as the specifically foreseen person-limited class standard, the
justices intentionally were looser in their formulations, and more
inclined to be guided by qualitative considerations as derived from
individual bodies of facts in discrete circumstances.
86
a 1969 case involving acquiIn Dimond Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton,1
sition of the defendant-auditor's client, the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, on facts closely resembling those in Candler, applied the
special relationship language of Hedley Byrne. It held the requisite
relationship had been created at the time when a partner of the
defendant-audit firm, which had been negligent in auditing a client's
financial statements, showed them to the plaintiff at the client's request for the purpose of plaintiff's making the offer by which he
purchased all of the client's shares in reliance on the financial statements. The relationship was found to exist even though the audit had
been completed several months earlier. 8"
Meanwhile, things were changing in England, where the House
of Lords announced a willingness to depart from precedent in appropriate circumstances. 88 In 1970, in a property damage case, the law
lords more or less abandoned the syllogism in negligence cases which
had been cherished by common-law lawyers for centuries.
The form of the order assumes the familiar analysis of the tort of
negligence into its three component elements, viz the duty of care,
the breach of that duty and the resulting damage. The analysis is
logically correct and often convenient for purposes of exposition,
but it is only an analysis and should not eliminate consideration of
the tort of negligence as a whole. It may be artificial and unhelpful

In support of the expansion of liability for negligence, another justice said: "The grounds of
action may be as various and manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of
judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life." Id. at 619.
115 See supra notes 35 & 175 and accompanying text.
18 [1969] N.Z.L.R. 609 (N.Z. Ct. App.).
181Id. at 628.
188 In 1966 the law lords affirmed their respect for the use of precedent as affording some
degree of certainty and as a basis for orderly development of law, but said that "too rigid
adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the
proper development of the law." Note, [196613 All E.R. 77 (H.L.). Accordingly, while continuing to treat their precedents as normally binding, they would change their procedure and would
depart from precedent "when it appears right to do so." Id.
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to consider the question as to the existence of a duty of care in
isolation from the elements of breach of duty and damage. The
actual damage alleged to have been suffered by the [plaintiffs] may
be an example of a kind or range of potential damage which was
foreseeable, and if the act or omission by which the damage was
caused is identifiable, it may put one on the trail of a possible duty
of care of which the act or omission would be a breach. In short, it
may be illuminating to start with the damage and work back
through the cause of it to the possible duty which may have been
broken.'8 9
A justice observed that on the facts "in the present case it would not
only be fair and reasonable that a duty of care should exist but that it
would be contrary to the fitness of things were it not so." ' a Another
found proximity: -[A]s boat-owners [plaintiffs] were in law
'neighbours'of the [defendants] and so there was a duty of care owing
by the [defendants] to [them]. .

.

. To some extent the decision in this

case must be a matter of impression and instinctive judgment as to
1
what is fair and just.''
A definition of "neighbour" by a justice in an important earlier
products liability case is evocative of the road to Jericho, 92 though "in
law" its qualities are admittedly more "restricted" than those of the
Good Samaritan:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law: You
must not injure your neighbour, and the lawyers' question: Who is
my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then, in
law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 193
In dictum in a 1977 damage suit for defective house construction,
one of the justices illustrated his interpretation of Hedley Byrne with
the following example:
1"9Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1052 (H.L.). In Dorset Yacht
inadequately supervised borstal (reform) school boys escaped and stole a yacht that collided with
and damaged plaintiff's yacht. The Home Office was held liable for the negligence of its
personnel in failing to adequately supervise the inmates. Judge Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v.
Long Island R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), was cited. Dorset Yacht, [1970] A.C. at 1036.
110Id. at 1039.
tI Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
192 Luke 10:27-37.
1 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
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[A] well known firm of accountants certifies in a prospectus the
annual profits of the company issuing it and unfortunately, due to
negligence on the part of the accountants, the profits are seriously
overstated. Those persons who invested in the company in reliance
on the accuracy of the accountants' certificate would have a claim
for damages against the accountants for any money
they might
94
have lost as a result of the accountants' negligence.1
The Hedley Byrne of that dictum is no longer, if ever it really was, the
Hedley Byrne that United States lawyers had been associating with
specifically foreseen persons or even limited foreseen classes. The
implication for accountants' liability to nonclients is evident.
Two of three justices in Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane,1 5 a 1978
New Zealand appellate decision, reached the rather radical conclusion that the negligent defendant-auditor had a duty of care (under
Hedley Byrne) to a subsequent purchaser of its publicly owned and
traded corporate client whose reliance upon the auditors was reasonably foreseeable. The court arrived at this result on the basis that the
client appeared vulnerable to takeover, though the proposed purchase
and purchaser were unknown to the auditor at the time of audit and
such reliance therefore was not and could not have been actually
foreseen by him. 9 6 The justice who dissented on the law (citing
Hedley Byrne and other authorities, and quoting section 552 and
accompanying comments at some length) reasoned that a special relationship requires that the auditor be aware that some particular person or class will rely upon the auditor's opinion for the purpose of
some particular type of transaction. 9 7 Accountants, the dissent concluded, should not be treated
as assuming a responsibility towards all persons dealing with the
company or its members, in reliance to some greater or lesser
degree on the accuracy of the accounts, merely because it was
reasonablyforeseeable, in a general way, that a transaction of the
kind in which the plaintiff happened to become involved might
19 8
indeed take place.

Anns v. London Borough of Merton, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.).
-5 [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553, 580 (N.Z. Ct. App. 1977) ("an elementary error" of failing to
eliminate double-counting of subsidiary income to the extent that it was received by the parent in
dividends), cited in Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350 n.13, 461 A.2d at 153 n.13; seesupra notes 160-63
and accompanying text for a discussion of Scott Group.
1'6 Scott Group, [1978] N.Z.L.R. at 580.
" Id. at 560-68 (citing and quoting § 552 and comments; citing Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 170,
174 N.E. at 441, Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 236, 135 N.E. at 275, and W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
194

LAW OF TORTS

706-09 (4th ed. 1971)).

I98
Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
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One of the two justices in the majority said of Hedley Byrne that
"a duty of care owed by the authors of negligent information or advice
to those who rely upon it ... depends upon the existence of the rather
elusive sort of relationship discussed in that case."' 9' In order to
"remove some degree of uncertainty," he subscribed to the "comprehensible and straightforward test of foreseeability. "200 As to limitations on such a standard of duty, he considered it "unwise to endeavour' to lay down in advance precise rules," because "[t]he facts of
individual cases are likely to provide a far more reliable and equitable
guide." 20' On the facts of the case at hand, he considered the defendant-auditor to be culpable under the foreseeability rule, and found
20 2
no reason to limit the force of the rule.
The other justice in the majority on the law found that the
takeover transaction was "reasonably foreseeable, ' 20 3 but he used the
term in a factual sense, not as a generality. He then observed that
"[t]he authorities are replete with warnings against generalizing in the
law of negligence, 20 4 quoting a House of Lords opinion which stated:
"As with any other important case in the development of the
common law Hedley Byrne should not be regarded as intended to
lay down the metes and bounds of the new field of negligence of
which the gate is now opened. Those will fall to be ascertained step
come before the courts
by step as the facts of particular cases which
'2°5
make it necessary to determine them.
He spoke of the "signposts . . .involving such notions as neighbours,
control, proximity. . . .[W]hatever the general formulations current
from time to time, an essentially pragmatic approach has been characteristic of the leading English tort cases in modern times . .0. ,06
His citation of section 552 amounted to damnation with faint praise:
Instructive as is the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts
adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1976
and published in 1977, it must face the usual difficulties besetting
any attempt at crystallisation [sic] in the nature of a code in a wide

...Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
200

Id. at 574.

201

Id. at 575.

203

Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 582.

204

Id.

202

205
20'

Id. at 582-83 (quoting Mutual Life & Citizen's Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 793).
Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
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and constantly developing field. For instance, not surprisingly the
whole of sec [sic] 552 contains no example of a case exactly fitting
20 7
the present.
After the considerable amount of time devoted to the negligence
issue, one of the two justices in the majority on the law concluded that
plaintiff had failed to prove damages. This resulted in a different and
disparate majority awarding victory to the auditor.
The opinion in the more -recent JEB Fasteners Ltd. v. Marks,
Bloom & Co.20 8 is cited conspicuously in Rosenblum, 20 9 and may have
influenced its outcome. As in Scott, the JEB controversy arose from a
takeover of the defendant-auditor's client, in which the negotiations
commenced after the completion of the audit. Upon request, the
auditor prepared and furnished to plaintiffs principals various information concerning the client. 210 It was subsequently determined that
the audited financial statements for the year preceding the takeover
by plaintiff reflected an assortment of negligent errors, although the
only significant error was a material overstatement of inventory valuation, without which there would have been a net loss rather than a
21
net income. 1
The opinion is useful because it opens with a brief though concentrated survey on the United Kingdom and Commonwealth law of
accountants' liability to nonclients for negligence. 212 The court found
that since the auditor was aware during the audit that the client
needed outside financial support, it ought reasonably to have foreseen
(i.e., perceived that there was a reasonable foreseeability) that a
takeover by an acquirer relying on the audited financial statements
would occur. 213 Upon analysis of the precedents, and "[w]ithout laying down any principle which is intended to be of general application,"-214 the court concluded that the auditor's knowledge established
2 5
a duty of care to plaintiff. 1
The court, however, also concluded from the evidence that plaintiffs management, which was experienced in the same line of business, suspected that the inventory was substantially overvalued, and
207

Id.

[1981] 3 All E.R. 289, af'd, [1983] 1 All E.R. 583 (C.A.) (citing Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at
170, 174 N.E. at 441, § 552, and Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff,
Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972)).
200 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 333 & 352 n.14, 461 A.2d at 142 & 153 n.14.
210 JEB, [1981] 3 All E.R. at 299.
211 Id. at 300.
"I Id. at 291-96.
213 Id. at 300-01.
214 Id. at 296.
215 Id. at 301.
208
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that they were interested primarily in obtaining the services of the
client's two principal officers, who actually proved to be a great
disappointment. On that evidence, the court ruled that the defendantauditor's negligence was not the cause of plaintiff's loss, and entered
2 16
judgment for defendant.
Since it appears that the recent United Kingdom-Commonwealth
opinions may be tending to influence the United States law of negligent misrepresentation away from the specifically foreseen toward the
reasonably foreseeable, or may do so in the future, it becomes important for United States judges and lawyers to be aware of the rationale
of those opinions. The need for such awareness becomes particularly
apparent when it is realized that the liberality of those opinions may
result in greater monetary risks in United States litigation because of
the following considerations: the availability of class action suits;
recovery of contingent plaintiffs' counsel fees; more liberal damages
formulations; and heavier defense litigation expenses with no prospect, as there is in the United Kingdom-Commonwealth, of reimbursement from plaintiff in the event of a successful defense. Thus,
one may respect the generally excellent quality of the United Kingdom-Commonwealth opinions without necessarily accepting the intellectual processes employed in their formulation.
Opinions in which the major premise of the syllogism-the general rule of law-has been diluted to a point of insignificance may
appeal to some jurists, not only as a convenient means of administration of litigation, but more importantly because the judges believe
sincerely, and perhaps with some justification, that they may thereby
achieve more equitable results. In the view of many jurists and lawyers, however, those advantages are considered to be outweighed by
the resulting tendency to obscure the substantive rules that everyone is
expected to observe in his relations with other persons, and that are
helpful to legal advisers in guiding their clients in observance of the
law. Even with the imperfection attendant on all human effort, the
Restatements of the Law are one monument to the preponderant
belief of the bar in the United States that observance of the law is
217
fostered by clarity in the enunciation of legal rules.

216

Id. at 301, 304-05. Similarly, Toromont Indus. Holdings Ltd. v. Thorne, Gunn, Helliwell

& Christenson, 62 D.L.R.3d 225, 247, 252 (Ont. High Ct. 1975) (defendant-auditor's damages
limited to cost of new audit and any related legal expenses), modified, 73 D.L.R.3d 122, 124
(Ont. Ct. App. 1976), cited in Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350 n.12, 461 A.2d at 122 n.12.
211Occasionally, there are attempts to deviate from that approach. For instance, the persistent advocacy by one United States court of appeals of a "flexible duty standard," originally of
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THE CONSEQUENCES

In the United Kingdom and Commonwealth and in New Jersey
and Wisconsin, the liability of accountants to nonclients for negligence is determinable by reasonable foreseeability.2 18 In a different
minority of United States jurisdictions, their liability continues to be
limited largely to those with whom they are in privity of contract,2 19
although the vitality of that limitation has diminished over the years.
In a considerable number of jurisdictions, their liability is measured
by the intermediate Restatement test of the specifically foreseen person and limited class.2 20 That view appears to predominate at the
present time. The recent adoption of the reasonable foreseeability test
by two state's highest courts does not necessarily foretell a trend away
from the foreseen, but may provide only another illustration of local
divergencies in a multistate system of law.
Despite the fact that an accountant who is negligent is less culpable than one who commits fraud, the application of reasonable foreseeability to negligence would expose an accountant who is only negligent to consequences as severe as those which visit an accountant who
commits fraud. 22' The objective of influencing the behavior of defendants is forgotten when courts become preoccupied with compensating plaintiffs.
Some courts, including the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rosenblum, have revealed a disconcertingly casual attitude concerning
accountants' liability insurance, assuming that through insurance,
accountants may serve as a conduit for spreading losses to the public

negligence, in cases under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), respectively, varying qualitatively according to
defendant's relationship to plaintiff, access to information, benefit, and actions, in a succession
of opinions starting with White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974). See Spectrum
Fin. Cos. v. Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing summary judgment
for co-defendant auditors), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980), including a specially concurring
opinion asserting that subsequent to Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (which rejected a negligence standard of duty under
rule 10b-5) it is inappropriate "to engage in a complex, multi-facted [sic] duty analysis which
was designed to test negligence." Spectrum Fin. Cos., at 384. The flexible duty standard has not
been accepted widely by courts other than federal district courts in the circuit of its origin.
218 See also supra note 115 for a discussion of one California court's obvious preference for the
reasonable foreseeability standard.
219 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 42.
220 See, e.g., Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85; Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 395; see also authorities cited
supra note 78.
221 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TOnTS §§ 531, 550-51 (1977).
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in the form of higher fees for professional services. 222 Perhaps judges
become case-hardened in observing accountants, as well as other professionals, represented in litigation by insurance defense counsel. The
language in the opinions suggests that the judges may view such
insurance as a commodity readily purchasable in a variety of shapes,
sizes, and most-wanted features.
The brief statements in most of the opinions cite no factual bases
for the courts' observations, and some suggest that the courts in fact
had none.2 23 In Rosenblum, for instance, neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendant briefed or argued the subject of insurance before the New
Jersey Supreme Court, except in answers to some questions asked by
the court.224 Nevertheless, the court stated: "Independent auditors
have apparently been able to obtain liability insurance covering these
risks or otherwise to satisfy their financial obligations. We have no
reason to believe that they may not purchase malpractice insurance
policies . . ." covering negligence. 22 5 In support of that statement, the
court cited 1976 and 1969 information on insurance companies issuing
such policies with a low maximum coverage, 22 but furnished no
information as to those companies' criteria in underwriting individual
risks. Only when the defendant contended in oral argument that the
cost of coverage against foreseeability risk would be "catastrophic" did
the court invoke the legal formalities, saying that "defendants have
not alerted us to data either within or outside the record to support
this position. '227 The intermediate appeals court at least acknowledged defendants' argument that the aggregate claims of $100 million

222

Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 91; Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 904,

451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982); Citizens State Bank, 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365; Scott
Group, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 572. None of these opinions cited any evidence of other supporting
factual authority; Spherex referred to a law review student note. Spherex, Inc., 122 N.H. at 904,
451 A.2d at 1312 (citing Note, Accountants' Liability for Negligence-A Contemporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (1979)). For contrary views, recognizing the potential problems associated with accountants' liability insurance, see Briggs v. Sterner,
529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (costs of liability insurance exceed benefits derived
from spreading risk to public at large); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 138 N.J. Super. 417, 422,
444 A.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 1982) (making reference to defendant- auditor's contention that
accountants could not endure costs of liability insurance), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 93 N.J.
324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
12
See supra note 222.
224 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 349 & n.ll, 461 A.2d at 151 & n.il.
225 Id. (emphasis added).
I1 (citing Note, Accountants' Liabilityfor Negligence2216 Id. at 349 n.11, 461 A.2d at 151 n.
A ContemporaryApproachfor a Modern Profession. 48 FORDHAM L.
227 Id. at 349 n.
1l, 461 A.2d at 151 n.1l.
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401, 415 n.81 (1979)).
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in related litigations were effectively uninsurable, at least on tolerable
228
terms.
One suspects that other courts are also guided only by conjecture
concerning the availability to practicing accountants of liability insurance. Such conjecture is unwarranted in the absence of evidence in the
litigation record, especially in the case of smaller firms and practitioners. Insurers enter into and withdraw from particular lines of insurance in accordance with what they perceive to be their best business
interests, developing a new line to seek profits, and discontinuing an
existing line to stem losses. For a time during recent years, only one
insurer was offering accountants' liability insurance in New York,
with a maximum coverage of only $2 million, a sum inadequate for
practitioners other than those serving clients of modest means and
activities. During that period, premium charges increased radically.
In addition, insurers have become increasingly discriminating in the
issuance and renewal of coverage. During periods when insurers have
had unfavorable loss and loss expense experience, there have been
increased numbers of instances in which accountants have experienced denials of coverage by their insurers on arguably questionable
grounds, and pressure from their insurers to contribute to the settlements of claims. Moreover, insurance does not compensate an accountant for the sometimes extensive amount of time diverted from his
practice to the litigation, and for the loss of productivity as a result of
distraction. The courts' statements suggest a lack of acquaintance with
accountants' liability insurance problems.
Since much or all of the cost of liability insurance may be passed
on to accountants' clients and ultimately to the public,2 29 the utility of
imposing such a cost is debatable. 230 It would be most informative if
comparative data could be obtained of the amounts of payments
under those policies for (1) losses, including settlements, and (2) loss
expenses, which are largely litigation costs.
Apart from the subject of insurance, courts and commentators do
not witness the continuing destructive effect of adjudication of professional liability upon the professional practice and stature of accountants,2 31 the human blight that extends beyond their professional ca-

228 H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 422, 444 A.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
22' Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152; Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177
(S.D. Iowa 1981); Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 91.
230 Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
1' Haddon View, 70 Ohio St. 2d at 160-61, 436 N.E.2d at 216-17 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).

1984]

ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY TO NONCLIENTS

573

reers into their personal lives, and the stress that impairs their
productivity and their physical and emotional health. 232 It is true in
general that practitioners of professions and callings are exposed to
varying risks, according to the nature of their services and those
affected by them, but a distinctive characteristic of risk in the practice
of professional accounting and auditing is that an error-innocent,
negligent, reckless, or worse-may lead to claims by large numbers of
people of potentially enormous aggregate losses. 233 A minor error
committed in a brief lapse from the exercise of reasonable care may
have severe financial consequences, and may entail risk of financial
responsibility on a scale that is grotesquely disproportionate to the
23 4
culpability of the professional.
Those who are familiar with accounting and auditing processes
are aware of the limitations and human imperfections of the processes
and the information. Not all the things that should be detected will be
detected. Not all the things that are observed by the professional are
what they seem to be. Although in hindsight, accountants and auditors, as well as judges and juries, can observe what was not observed
before, there will always be disagreement over what was then observable in the exercise of care. Because of the magnitude of potential loss,
professional accounting is a high-risk activity. Despite the chorus of
commentators who consider their wisdom to be superior to Judge
Cardozo's, in his risk evaluation, Cardozo had it right the first time.

"I See Goldwasser,

Accountants' Professional Liability-Study Guide 3-2, 3-3 (1982).
One exception are those special engagements of such nature that the accountant's work will
be relied upon by only one or, at most, few nonclients. E.g., United States Nat'l Bank v. Fought,
291 Or. 201, 630 P.2d 337 (1981) (defendant-accountant's reports of accounts receivable collections for reliance of client's sole bank lender in making additional advances).
23 As Prosser has written, "The spectre of unlimited liability, with claims devastating in
number and amount crushing the defendant because of a momentary lapse from proper care, has
haunted the courts." W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Torrs 708 (4th ed. 1971), quoted in
Denbeste v. Meriwether, Wilson & Strick, No. 75-35-D, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 2, 1981)
(defendant-auditor).
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